Merchant fees and reward programs generate an implicit monetary transfer from "cash" users to credit card users because merchants generally do not set differential prices for card users to recoup the costs of merchant fees. On average, each cash-using household transfers $50 to households that use credit cards, and each credit card using household receives a subsidy of $240 every year. Among card users, the benefits are unequalcard users with unpaid revolving debt ("revolvers") pay a transfer of $511 and those without debt ("convenience" users) receive a subsidy of $833. Because credit card spending and rewards are positively correlated with household income, cash-to-card transfers are regressive. On average, the lowest-income household ($20, 000 or less annually) pays $63 and the highest-income household ($150, 000 or more annually) receives $823 every year.
Introduction
The typical consumer is largely unaware of the full ramifications of paying for goods and services by credit card. Faced with many choices-cash, check, debit or credit card, etc.-consumers naturally consider the costs and benefits of each payment instrument and choose accordingly. For credit cards, consumers likely think most about their benefits: delayed payment-"buy now, pay later"-and the rewards earned-cash back, frequent flier miles, or other enticements. What most consumers do not know is that their decision to pay by credit card involves merchant fees, retail price increases and nontrivial transfers of income from cash to card payers and from low-income to high-income consumers.
In contrast, the typical merchant is acutely aware of the ramifications of his customers' decisions to pay with credit cards. For the privilege of accepting credit cards, U.S. merchants pay banks a fee that is proportional to the dollar value of the sale. The merchant's bank then pays a proportional interchange fee to the consumer's credit card bank.
1 Naturally, merchants seek to pass the merchant fee to their customers. Merchants may want to recoup the merchant fee only from consumers who pay by credit card. In practice, however, credit card companies impose a "no-surcharge rule" (NSR) that prohibits U.S. merchants from doing so, and most merchants are reluctant to give cash discounts. 2 Instead, merchants mark up their retail prices for all consumers by enough to recoup the merchant fees from credit card sales.
This retail price markup for all consumers results in users of credit cards being subsidized by "cash" users (those who do not pay with credit cards), a result that was first discussed in Carlton and Frankel (1995) , and later in Frankel (1998) , Katz (2001) , Gans and King (2003) , 1 Shy and Wang (2011) show that card networks extract higher surplus from merchants using proportional merchant fees (rather than fixed, per-transaction fees). The amount of surplus that card networks can extract increases with the degree of merchants' market power.
2 Card associations allow U.S. merchants to give cash discounts under certain restrictions. However, cash discounts are not widely observed. Frankel (1998) argues that a prohibition on credit card surcharges can have effects different from those resulting from a prohibition on cash discounts, because card surcharges allow merchants to vary their charges according to the different merchant fees they pay on different cards, whereas a cash discount is taken from a single card price.
and Schwartz and Vincent (2006) . For simplicity, we refer to consumers who do not pay by credit card as cash payers, where "cash" represents all payment instruments other than credit cards: cash, checks, debit and prepaid cards, etc.-all of which represent non-credit payments from current assets with little or no float.
3 "Subsidize" means that merchant fees are (fully or partially) passed on to all buyers in the form of higher retail prices regardless of the means of payments buyers use to pay. Thus, cash buyers must pay higher retail prices to cover merchants' costs associated with the credit cards' merchant fees. Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) point out that the subsidy received by credit card users may not be shared equally between credit card users who carry high-interest revolving debt ("revolvers") and those who do not ("convenience" credit card users), a distinction we quantify for the first time in this paper. Because these fees are used to pay for rewards given to credit card users, and since cash users do not receive rewards, cash users also finance part of the rewards given to credit card users. Similarly, as indicated in Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) , revolvers face extremely high interest rates to partially cover the rewards given to all card users including those to do not borrow.
If the previously described cross-subsidies result from heterogeneity in consumer preferences and utility between cash, card (convenience) and card (revolving) payments, then they may be innocuous in terms of consumer and social welfare. However, U.S. data show that credit card use is highly positively correlated with consumer income. Consequently, these subsidies involve a regressive transfer of income from low-income to high-income consumers. This regressive transfer is amplified by the disproportionate distribution of rewards, which are proportional to credit card sales, to high-income credit card users. 4 Frankel (1998, Footnote 85) was the first to connect the wealth transfers to average income of groups of con-3 McAndrews and Wang (2008) demonstrates the possibility of a subsidy in the opposite direction (from card users to cash users) in cases where merchants' cost of handling cash exceeds merchants' card fees. McAndrews and Wang's definition of cards includes debit cards, which are less costly (when used with a PIN) than credit cards, whereas in our paper debit cards are included as part of "cash." Humphrey et al. (1996) and Humphrey et al. (2006) also provide evidence that electronic payment instruments, such as debit cards, are less costly than paper instruments, such as cash or check. Again, however, we focus only on credit cards, which have high merchant fees and are more costly than other payment instruments, paper or electronic.
4 See Hayashi (2009) and her references for a comprehensive overview of card reward programs.
sumers (that is, lower-income non-cardholders subsidizing higher-income cardholders). This idea was later discussed in Carlton and Frankel (2005, pp. 640-641) , Frankel and Shampine (2006, Footnote 19) , and Semeraro (2009).
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Our contribution to this line of research is that we are the first to compute calibrated estimates of who gains and who loses from credit card payments in the aggregate (U.S.) economy. We propose a simple, model-free accounting methodology to compute all credit-card related transfers among consumers by comparing the costs imposed by individual consumer payment choices with actual prices paid by each buyer, augmented by consumers decisions to revolve unsecured credit card debt. Our methodology computes dollar-value estimates of the actual transfers from cash payers to card payers, distinguishing between convenience and revolving card users, as well as transfers between low-income to high-income households. A related paper by Berkovich (2009) estimates the total amount transferred from non-rewards consumers to rewards consumers in the United States resulting from gasoline and grocery purchases only.
6
Our results indicate that cash users and revolving credit card users subsidize convenience credit card users by non-trivial amounts each year. On average, each cash-using household transfers $50 to households that use credit cards and each credit card using household receives a subsidy of $240 every year. Among card users, the benefits are unequal-card users with unpaid revolving debt ("revolvers") pay a transfer of $511 and those without debt ("convenience" users) receive a subsidy of $833. Because credit card spending and rewards are positively correlated with household income, cash-to-card transfers are regressive. On average, the lowest-income household ($20, 000 or less annually) pays $63 and the highestincome household ($150, 000 or more annually) receives $840 every year.
We take as given the well-established, seminal result of Rochet and Tirole (2006) 6 This estimated transfer is about $1.4 billion to $1.9 billion, and rewards are found to have a disproportionate impact on low-income minorities that resemble a regressive tax on consumption. These estimates focus exclusively on rewards transfers and do not account for the full range of transfers from low-to high-income consumers resulting from merchant fees and a lack of price differentiation among payment instruments.
cerning the critical role of an interchange fee between acquiring and issuing banks in the two-sided credit card market, a result that notes that the optimal level of the interchange fee is an empirical issue.
7 By incorporating both merchant fees and card rewards rates, we can assume that the interchange fee lies between these rates and is set exogenously within the banking sector that includes issuers, acquirers, and card networks. 8 We also take as given the decision by merchants to accept payment instruments by assuming a "mature" market in which all merchants accept all instruments, but we evaluate the sensitivity of our results to variation in the distribution of household shopping patterns across merchants and variation in the extent of merchants' pass-through of merchant fees to retail prices. Credit card payments produce a regressive transfer among households for all empirically relevant specifications of shopping patterns, even when low-income and high-income households shop in separate stores. However, as pass-through of the payment costs to retail prices falls below 50 percent, the transfer reverses and become progressive.
We want to be clear that we do not allege or imply that banks or credit card companies have designed or operated the credit card market intentionally to produce a regressive transfer from low-income to high-income households. We are not aware of any evidence to support this allegation or any a priori reason to believe it. However, the existence of a non-trivial regressive transfer in the credit card market may be a concern that U.S. individuals, businesses, or public policy makers wish to address. If so, our analysis suggests several principles for further study, consideration, and potential action. Policy actions toward interchange fees, both internationally (credit cards) and in the U.S. Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation (debit cards), typically have been motivated by concerns about competition in 7 A complete list of contributions to two-sided markets is too long to be included here. The interested reader can consult Chakravorti and Shah (2003) , Gans and King (2003) , Rochet (2003) , Wright (2003) , Roson (2005) , Evans and Schmalensee (2005) , Armstrong (2006) , Schwartz and Vincent (2006) , Bolt and Chakravorti (2008) , Hayashi (2008) , Rysman (2009), and Verdier (2011) . For a comprehensive empirical study of interchange fees, see Prager et al. (2009) . 8 Carroll (1997) provides motivation for credit cards to help consumers smooth income in the face of income and wealth shocks and achieve optimal consumption plans. However, the actual impact of credit card borrowing on consumer and social welfare is complicated, as can be seen from literature, including Brito and Hartley (1995) , Gross and Souleles (2002) , Chatterjee et al. (2007) , and Cohen-Cole (Forthcoming). Rochet and Wright (2010) build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. payment card markets and pricing. Our analysis provides a different but complementary motivation-eliminating a regressive transfer-for potential policy intervention in the credit card market, which may not be relevant for debit cards.
Section 2 documents three basic facts about card card use. Section 3 and 4 characterizes the major players in the credit card markets (households, merchants, and banks). Section 5 demonstrates a simple "accounting" of transfers from cash to card users and from low-to highincome buyers. Section 6 provides sensitivity analysis focusing on different pass-through of merchant fees. Section 8 concludes with policy implications. Appendix A provides an analytical model of consumer payment choice.
Basic Facts about Credit Cards
This section establishes three basic facts about credit cards: (i) consumer credit card use has been increasing, (ii) consumer credit card use and rewards are positively correlated with household income, and (iii) the incidence of credit card borrowing is not strongly correlated with income, although the burden of credit card revolving debt is heavier on low-income households.
Credit cards in the economy
Over the last two decades, payment cards have enjoyed increased popularity in all sectors of the economy. Our research focuses on credit and charge cards used by households only. Figure 1 shows that the fraction of households who have a credit card (adopters) has been steady at about 70-75 percent during the past two decades, reflecting the maturity of the market.
However, the percentage of total consumption expenditure paid for by credit card clearly increased during the same period.
9 Assuming that merchants fees did not decrease, revenue 9 Both series were taken from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which asked consumers about the amount of credit card charges they had in the previous month (variables x412 x420 x423 x426 ) since 1989 ("Consumption spending volume") and about credit card adoption (variable x410 ) since 1989 ("Credit card adoption rate"). The denominator of the consumption spending share series is the Personal Consumption Expenditure. 
Card use and income
The literature has found a positive relationship between income and credit card adoption [see Stavins (2001) , Mester (2003) , Bertaut and Haliassos (2006) , Klee (2006) , Zinman (2009a) ], but there has been less focus on the relationship between income and credit card use (see Schuh and Stavins (2010) for an exception). as reported in published aggregate data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.) The proportion of households who have (adopted) at least one credit card increases monotonically with income (first column). Average new monthly charges on all credit cards held by a household also increases monotonically with income among households who have adopted credit cards (second and third columns). 12 Interestingly, the average new charges are higher for revolvers than for convenience users in the lowest income bracket, but lower in the other income categories. And the share of credit card spending in total household consumption also increases monotonically with income (fourth and fifth column). 13 Again the asymmetry 11 Data on the number of transactions consumers make with credit cards, which are available from the new Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC), also reveal a positive correlation between income and use.
12 The new charge numbers are based on the following question from the 2007 SCF: "On your last bill, roughly how much were the new charges made to these [Visa, MasterCard, Discover, or American Express] accounts?" Because merchant fees are proportional to the amount charged on credit cards, regardless of whether the cardholder pays his monthly balance or carries it over to the next month, total new credit card charges for each household is the relevant measure of credit card use.
13 The share of credit card spending in household income actually decreases with household income, however, because the marginal propensity to consume falls with household income.
between the lowest and the two highest income brackets is remarkable, while the poorest households mostly revolve the richest ones primarily pay off their credit card balances within a month.
The data also reveal a strong positive correlation between consumer credit card rewards and household income, as shown in Most of our analysis splits the consumer population into two income groups: low-income households (< $100, 000 per year) and high-income households (≥ $100, 000). This decision is motivated by the need for parsimony in modeling and by the significant differences in credit card behavior between these two broad income groups. Table 1 shows that credit card spending by high-income consumers is nearly five times higher in dollar value, and more than triple in percentage terms for convenience users, than credit card spending by low-income consumers. Table 2 shows that high-income consumers are 20 percentage points more likely to receive credit card rewards. These differences between the lowest-income (less than $20,000 per year) and the highest-income ($150,000 per year or more) households' credit card spending and rewards is markedly greater. 
Credit card borrowing and income
While credit card adoption and use are positively correlated with income, the incidence of credit card borrowing tends to be more similar across households, as shown in Table 3 , which helps to evaluate the ideas of Chakravorti and Emmons (2003) . The incidence of revolving debt by low-income and high-income households is similar whether reported by consumers (33 and 31 percent, respectively) or measured by actual incidence (43 and 48 percent, respectively). This similarity in the incidence of revolving credit between income groups belies the conventional notion that credit card debt is predominantly a problem for low-income households. However, the burden of debt is greater for low-income households, in accordance with conventional wisdom. First, the average interest rate for low-income revolvers was moderately higher than for high-income revolvers (12.31 versus 11.65 percent, respectively). 15 In dollar terms, the average amount of outstanding revolving debt and the average revolving interest payment were both roughly twice as large for high-income households as for low-(2010) estimated the use of payment instruments as a function of various characteristics of these instruments, employing a 2006 survey of U.S. consumers. They found that, after controlling for income, the characteristics of convenience, cost, and timing of payment have a statistically significant effect on credit card use. 15 The interest rates in Table 3 are for all credit card holders (first rate) and the debt-weighted average for all revolvers (second rate). The other figures are averages over the entire income group except for the last two rows. income households. Yet as a percentage of income the burden on low-income households and high-income households was twice as large on the former (16.4 versus 8.1 percent for debt, and 1.9 versus 0.9 percent for debt service, respectively). It should also be noted from Table 1 that high-income households spend five times more on credit cards, which naturally means they benefit from the float period more than low-income families. Table 3 has important implications for revolving credit interest revenues for banks. The last two rows of Table 3 reveal that both income groups pay more than enough interest to cover the credit card rewards earned by that group. Thus, it seems unlikely that interest from either group cross-subsidizes the rewards of the other. The market has three types of agents: buyers (consumers), merchants, and "banks."
The Payments Market
Buyers can have high or low incomes and pay by credit card or cash (meaning all non-credit card payments). Merchants sell a representative good to all consumers.
16 Finally, "banks"
represents the financial market that provides credit card payment services. It includes banks that issue cards to consumers ("issuers"), banks that receive card payments from merchants ("acquirers"), and card companies (Visa or MasterCard are examples) that facilitate interactions among banks and between banks and their customers. 17 The literature on two-sided markets analyzes the details of the "banks" and merchant markets but tends to abstract from consumer heterogeneity, which precludes analysis of transfers among consumers. Our study takes the opposite approach.
Acquirer Issuer
LI cash users HI cash users LI convenience HI convenience It is instructive to walk through Figure 2 and follow the flow of payments starting from the households as it goes through the merchants and the banks before going back to the households. Buyers purchase a good for an endogenously determined price, p, using cash or credit card according to buyers' preferences for the payment instruments. Merchants incur a cost with either payment choice. For cash, merchants bear a cost, denoted 0 ≤ < 1, associated with handling cash transactions. Thus, the merchants' cost of accepting a cash transaction is · p. 18 For credit cards, merchants pay a fee, µ, to banks (acquirers) that is proportional to card sales. Thus, the merchants' cost of accepting a credit card transaction is µ · p. Table 4 displays estimates of merchants' costs of accepting "cash" (including several
18 As drawn, the cash-handling cost is a proportional cost. However, the actual cost of handling cash may include a fixed cost as well. Footnote 19 presents estimates of the cost of handling cash where could be interpreted as average cost that includes possible fixed costs because the data do not distinguish well between fixed and marginal costs. payment instruments) and credit cards. The limited available data suggest that a very rough estimate of the per-dollar merchant effort of handling currency (notes and coins) is = 0.5 percent.
19 Other components of "cash" have somewhat higher estimates, especially debit cards used without a PIN, which we would prefer to group with credit cards. However, the data needed for our analysis on the individual components of "cash" are not available.
The available data suggest that a reasonable estimate of the merchant fee across all types of cards, weighted by card use, is µ = 2 percent.
2.0% Card buyers receive a partial rebate of the merchant fee from banks (issuers) in the form of card rewards, ρ, that are proportional to card sales and are given to encourage credit card use. 21 Thus, card buyers receive reward income of ρ · p. Available data suggest that a reasonable estimate of the reward rate is ρ = 1 percent. 22 However, according to Table 2, 19 Garcia-Swartz, Hahn, and Layne-Farrar (2006) report that the marginal cost of processing a $54.24 transaction (average check transaction) is $0.43 (or 0.8 percent) if it is a cash transaction, and $1.22 (or 2.25 percent) if it is paid by a credit/charge card. The study by Bergman, Guibourg, and Segendorf (2007) for Sweden found that the total private costs incurred by the retail sector from handling 235 billion Swedish Crown (SEK) worth of transactions was 3.68 billion SEK in 2002, which would put our measure of cashhandling costs at = 1.6 percent. For the Norwegian payment system, Gresvik and Haare (2009) estimates that private costs of handling 62.1 billion Norwegian Crown (NOK) worth of cash transactions incurred by the retailers was 0.322 billion NOK in 2007, which would imply = 0.5 percent.
20 Merchant fees in the United States were in the range of $40-$50 billion in 2008; see, for example, "Card Fees Pit Retailers Against Banks," New York Times, July 15, 2009. This range approximately equals 2 percent of the U.S. credit card sales for that same year in the Call Report data for depository institutions. Actual merchant fees are complex and heterogeneous, varying over card types and merchant category. We estimate merchant fees across cards as follows: general purpose (Visa, MasterCard, and Discover) 2 percent; American Express 2.2 percent; and specific purpose (branded) 1 percent, see Hayashi (2009) for some numbers.
21 To fund rewards, banks use revenue from merchant fees and possibly other sources, such as annual fees or interest from revolving credit card debt.
22 One-percent cash back is widely observed. Most airline mileage and other points systems also have an only 55 percent of low-income credit card holders receive rewards, compared with 75 percent of high-income card holders. For this reason, the representative (average) card user in either income group will not receive the full reward, ρ, but only ρ multiplied by the fraction of credit cards with rewards among all credit cards carried by this income group. Therefore, we set ρ L = 0.57 and ρ H = 0.79 to be the effective reward rates received by an average household belonging to income groups L (low) and H (high), respectively.
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Credit card buyers have an additional benefit and cost. Convenience users of credit cards benefit from a month worth of float measured byr/12, wherer can be viewed as the perdollar cost of commercial banks to provide this float. We derive an estimate ofr = 10.5 percent in Section 4. On the other hand, credit card revolvers must pay an interest rate r to banks according to their income level, as indicated in Table 3 .
The merchant fee and reward rate are closely related to pricing decisions that are internal to banks. Acquirers pay a proportional fee, ι, to issuers. When the card issuer and card acquirer are owned by different financial institutions, ι is called an interchange fee. Because interchange fees involve the fixing of fees by competing card issuers, they have triggered many debates and court cases against card organizations by antitrust authorities and merchant associations. 24 Typically, banks make profits by setting ρ < ι < µ, which we assume holds.
Our analysis of the transfers among consumers requires only the merchant fee and reward rate and not the inclusion of the interchange fee.
Banks also incur costs κ of providing credit card payment services. The best available data suggest a reasonable estimate is κ = 0.2 percent, which we derive as follows. The resource costs of credit card payments consists of the network fees plus losses due to fraudulent transactions. For credit card transactions, roughly 85-90 percent of the merchant fee is approximate cash value of about ρ = 1 percent. 23 Parameters ρ L and ρ H are set to be equal to the credit-card-spending-weighted average of the adoption numbers in the top half of Table 2 , which explains the slight difference from 0.55 and 0.75. In practice, the actual reward rate could be even lower, because holders of reward credit cards do not claim all of their rewards or they let the rewards expire, but we do not have data on the rate at which and how many consumers actually claim their rewards.
24 Some court cases in the United States and worldwide are discussed in Bradford and Hayashi (2008) .
the interchange fee paid to issuers. The remaining 10-15 percent goes to the card networks and acquirers in the form of various other small and fixed fees (switch fee, surcharge fee, network access fee, etc.), which are a rough estimate for the resource cost of operating the credit card network. According to Sullivan (2010) 
Agents and Data
This section provides a more detailed description of the agents in our simplified economy that were introduced in the previous section. It also documents the data used to measure agents' activity, which are key inputs used to compute the transfers in the next section.
Households
In our calculations, we distinguish between low-and high-income households indexed by Note that in our calculations we only use spending data on goods/services where we believe both cash and credit cards could potentially be used. 27 For more details about the CEX data source, see Harris and Sabelhaus (2000) .
employer-provided health insurance, and fees paid for financial services, and thus we exclude this portion of spending from the calculations. described earlier, we set $100, 000 as the cutoff level of household income (denoted I).
When sorting the households within an income group according to payment instruments, we assign the total spending done with a payment instrument to the respective group of households. For example, we find that all low-income households who report that they have no credit card debt spent $0.23 trillion in 2007 using their credit cards, so we assign this figure to the group of low income convenience users. To have an estimate of the number of households who belong to an income/payment instrument category, we assume that the disposable income of each household within the same income group is the same. This will essentially make the distribution of the number of households proportional to the spending shares within the income groups.
Our data reflect the well-known fact that consumption and income are distributed unevenly across households, as shown in Table 5 , which converts the information in Table 1 into a form that is useful for computation of the transfers. Low-income buyers account for 81 percent of all households but only 58 percent of transactions. Low-income buyers also tend to favor cash payments: 70 percent of all households are low-income cash buyers, and 50 percent of all transactions are conducted by low-income cash buyers. In addition, highincome households have a disproportionately higher share of credit card transactions (about 13/42 ≈ 31 percent) than their population share (19 percent). Overall, the data show that high-income households make greater use of credit cards.
28 We thank Tim Chen (Nerdwallet.com), Leon Majors (Phoenix Marketing International), and Jay Zagorsky (Boston University) for helping us clarify whether credit cards can be used for mortgage payments.
29 Zinman (2009b) compares the SCF with industry data and finds that the two sources match up well on credit card charges and fairly well on account balance totals. 
Distribution of Households

Merchants
Merchants supply one "good," which could be either a product or a service. This assumption is necessary because of a lack of data on payment choice for individual goods; in any case, many payments are made for a basket of different goods. Similar to Wang (2010), we model a "mature" card market in which all merchants accept payment cards and cash.
Thus, consumers do not have to search for a merchant who accepts their preferred payment instrument, and merchants do not have to decide which payment instruments to accept to attract consumers. This matching problem is interesting and potentially important for the analysis, but considerably more complex and left for future research.
However, the distribution of household shopping across merchants affects the calculation of the transfers. For example, if high-income households only used credit cards and low-income households only used cash, and there was complete separation of shopping by households across merchants, there would be no transfers from credit card payments. Such polar cases almost surely do not hold in the real world, but there is likely some partial separation of payments by household throughout the market along at least two dimensions.
Some merchants primarily attract high-income households based on their luxury goods with higher prices. Other merchants primarily attract high-income households based on their neighborhoods because households tend to separate geographically by income. 30 Regardless of the reason, differential shopping patterns will lead households to face heterogeneous markups across merchants and thus pay different amounts for their payment choices.
To account for the fact that high-income and low-income households may shop in different proportion at merchants, we assume there are two merchants (for simplicity) with different shares of households as customers. Denote by λ H , λ L the fractions of high-income and lowincome buyers who shop at merchant 1. Therefore, if λ H = λ L = 1 (or = 0), all households in an income group shop at the same merchant, whereas if λ H = λ L = 0.5, both income groups are equally split between stores. In contrast, if λ H = 0 = 1 = λ L , households belonging to different income groups shop at entirely different places.
Households belonging to income group i = L, H are assumed to spend an exogenouslygiven fraction λ i of their income at merchant 1 and fraction 1 − λ i at merchant 2. Unfortunately, we do not have any hard data to calibrate the household shopping distributions, but it seems reasonable to avoid the unlikely polar cases of full separation and equal shopping patterns. We arbitrarily assume that 30 percent (λ L = 0.3) of low-income households and 70 percent (λ H = 0.7) of high-households go to merchant 1 (and vice versa for merchant 2), so merchant 1 primarily serves high-income households and merchant 2 primarily serves low-income households. However, Section 6.2 (see Figures 3) explores the sensitivity of the transfer estimates to variation in the distribution of shopping patterns.
Let M 1 and M 2 denote the cost per one dollar of sales of handling a payment for merchants 1 and 2 resulting from having to pay a percentage fee µ on credit card transactions 30 The business practices of national retailers tends to reduce the effects of geographic separation. The local chain stores of national retailers may have a wide mix of households and credit card spending shares across locations, but the national retailers usually pay merchant fees to credit card companies based on the retailers total U.S. credit card sales, not by chain location. Furthermore, in general, the national retailers do not charge their local chain stores differentially for merchant fees by credit card share, and they tend to avoid differential pricing of (common) goods across stores for all reasons, including variation in local payment costs. Hence chain stores in both low-income and high-income neighborhoods will end up using a nationwide markup. We thank Bob Turley for pointing this out based on his interviews with national retailers.
or bear a proportional cost of on handling cash. Then, for i = H, L,
In other words, the payment cost markup is a sales-weighted average of the merchant fee and cash handling costs associated with each payment instrument.
A key question to ask at this point is the extent to which merchants pass their costs of handling payment instruments (1) on to their customers. As shown in Weyl and Fabinger (2009) , an increase in cost may in general result in more or less than 100 percent increase in price. However, Appendix C shows that the cost of accepting payment instruments differ substantially from the unit production cost because the former is proportional to the price and not to the unit cost of production. In fact, merchant's cost of accepting payment instruments acts very much like an ad-valorem tax. Thus, the merchant markup is independent of the market structure. Therefore, in what follows, we will refer to the merchant per-dollar cost of accepting payment instruments (1) as markups and assume 100 percent pass-through as the benchmark. However, Section 6.3 explores the sensitivity of the transfer estimates to variation in the pass-through, from incomplete (less than 100 percent) to over-surcharging (more than 100 percent).
Banks
Our analysis focuses on banks' credit card activities only and ignores all other services. Banks have two sources of profit from credit card services. First, they earn profits from merchant fees, net of the resource costs incurred and rewards paid to card holders, which is given by
Banks bear the cost of funding the rewards programs (ρ) and the resource costs of payment service (κ). By the resource cost of providing the credit card service we mean the costs associated with maintaining the card network infrastructure and the losses associated with fraudulent transactions.
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The second source of bank profits is credit card lending. Letr denote banks' alternative cost of funding credit card debt. Banks have to fund both the credit card debt and the period of float extended to convenience users (only), which we assume to be one month. Banks collect interest payments from revolvers (only), which is i=H,L r b i S b i . The goal of this paper is to identify the sources of income that banks can use to fund the various benefits associated with credit cards, such as rewards. To do that, it is not enough to simply measure the total interest income, because what matters is the extra profit that can be used to fund benefits (that other bank services do not offer), such as making interest-free loans to convenience users. This profit will be measured as r b i −r per dollar loaned to revolving households. Therefore, we define aggregate bank profit from credit card services by 31 The cost of handling cash does not enter the banks profit function since we assume that cash handling is done by the merchant. This assumption is innocuous since the resource cost of handling cash is paid by customers; that is, we could make an alternative assumption in which banks incur the cost of cash and collect S h from the merchants. 32 This was the profit over total income figure in the Call Reports in 2007.
Transfer Accounting
This section introduces a simple, model-free approach to computing the implicit monetary transfers among consumers that result when some buyers pay with credit cards and others pay with "cash." At this point we do not set up a rigorous economic model because one is not needed for the computation of the transfers. However, we provide a simple model of consumer payment choice in Appendix A for the reader who is interested in mapping the transfer accounting into first principles. Our goal here is to fix terminology and highlight key elements of the flow of transfers.
The primary transfer is from cash buyers to credit card buyers occurring due to the payment decision. Because credit card users can carry over the payment balances from month to month, which causes these revolvers to pay interest to banks, there is a potential transfer occurring from revolvers to convenience users of credit cards. Finally, because credit card use is positively correlated with income, credit card payments also induce a transfer from low-income buyers to high-income buyers. Our methodology decomposes national income account data on consumption into consumer groups defined by payment choice and income level, using micro data on consumption, credit card spending, and related variables (along with the benchmark estimates of payment costs). Our methodology is analogous to the one used by Humphrey, Kaloudis, and Øwre (2004) to estimate cash use in Norway.
Transfer definitions
Our approach to defining transfers among households is to compare the benefits enjoyed by the users of a payment instrument with the actual amount buyers pay for the choice of a particular payment instrument. Since the flow of money from households through merchants to banks, and back to the households forms a closed loop, the economy-wide costs and benefits should be the same. This, however, does not mean that for every subgroup of the population the costs and the benefits are equalized, which is why we can measure transfers among household groups. For example, uniform pricing (no discount or surcharge for payment choice) leads to a retail price markup by merchants in which consumers do not face the value of the payment service that they use.
L denote the transfer received (subsidy, if positive), or transfer paid (if negative), by cash users, credit card users who do not borrow (convenience), and credit card users who borrow (revolvers) on their credit cards, respectively. Then, for each income group i = H, L, the transfer received by cash users (superscript h) is
Resource cost of cash payments
where the price markups, M 1 and M 2 , are defined in (1). Therefore, x 
Merchants' costs of cards and cash . The total transfers received by each income group i is the sum of the transfers received by the three payment instrument groups within that income category, Table 6 : Transfers in the payment market by household income and payment instrument. Note: Positive (negative) numbers indicate that households using a payment instrument has received a subsidy (paid a transfer).
Transfer estimates
but not quantitatively, as can be seen in the first row reporting total transfers. In dollar terms, the transfers sum to zero because the transfer paid by low-income households ($ − 7.8 billion) is the same in absolute value as the subsidy received by high-income households.
However, in per-household terms, the transfers do not sum to zero because there are four times as many low-income households as high-income households. Thus, the "pain" of the transfer is smaller for each low-income household because it is spread over more households, while the "gain" of the subsidy is larger for each high-income household because it is reaped by fewer households. In the discussion below, we focus mainly on the per-household figures because they are more tangible and relevant to individual households, but it is important to keep this distinction in mind.
To our knowledge, Table 6 contains the first quantitative estimates for the aggregate economy of transfers between buyers stemming from the choice of payment instrument. Two main results can be drawn regarding the cross-subsidies between cash and credit card users:
Result 1. Cash users subsidize credit card users.
(a) The average cash-paying household pays a transfer of $50 (x h = −50) annually.
(b) The average card-paying household receives a subsidy of $240 (x d = 240) annually.
Result 2. The subsidy received by credit card users is not shared equally; like cash users, credit card revolvers also subsidize credit card holders-those who use their cards for convenience and not borrowing.
(a) The average card-paying household that revolves debt pays a transfer of $511 (
annually.
(b) The average card-paying household that does not revolve debt (convenience user) receives a subsidy of $833 (x c = 833) annually.
(c) Together, the average cash-paying household and the average card-paying household that revolves debt pay a total transfer of $89 (x h +x b = −89) annually to subsidize convenience users of credit cards.
Next, the following main result can be drawn regarding the effect of the cross-subsidies on households of different income groups:
Result 3. Low-income households subsidize high-income households.
(a) The average low-income household pays a transfer of $83 (x L = −83) annually.
(b) The average high-income household receives a subsidy of $361 (x H = 361) annually.
Finally, the following main result raises important behavioral questions about the payment choices of households of different incomes.
Result 4. Household income is not a sufficient statistic for predicting either household payment choice or transfer paid (subsidy received). The joint heterogeneity of household income and payment choice is intriguing and difficult to explain with existing models. Much more research is needed to understand these outcomes in payment markets.
Sensitivity Analysis
This section reports the results of relaxing the assumptions about some key parameters underlying the transfer accounting. We explore variation in household income categories, household shopping patterns, the pass-through of the merchant fee to retail prices, and the role of credit card annual fees.
Household income categories
Transfer estimates based on two broad income categories significantly understate the magnitude of the transfer between the very lowest-income and very highest-income households, and they also conceal the strong nonlinearity in the relationship between the transfers and income. The average lowest-income household earns less than $20,000 and pays a transfer of $63 each year, while in sharp contrast the average highest-income household earns more than $150,000 and receives a subsidy of $823 each year. In between, the transfer is relatively flat across income groups until household income rises above $100, 000 annually then sharply increasing in the highest category (over $150,000). Thus, a very large number of lowerincome households each pays a relatively small dollar amount of transfer, while a very small number of higher-income groups receives a relatively large dollar amount of subsidy.
33
6.2 Household shopping patterns Figure 3 computes the transfer from low-to high-income households for all possible distributions of income groups between the two merchants. The yellow (bright) areas in Figure 3 33 Table 7 implies that the transfers computed with only two income groups may be sensitive to the cutoff income level. We chose a cutoff of $100, 000 for the reasons explained in Section 2. The estimates also show that the transfer paid increases nonlinearly with income, so a higher cutoff level is more representative of the transfer paid by the highest income groups. If the cutoff household income is $50, 000, which is closer to the poverty level, then low-income households pay a transfer of $XX and high-income households receives a subsidy of $XXX. These estimates suggest a qualitatively similar conclusion. show that the transfer reaches the highest level of $85 per year when they are equally distributed between the two merchants (λ L = λ H ). The red (dark) areas reflect calibrations when the income groups shop at different places, which shows that the transfer from low-to high-income households is reduced to $55 per year but not eliminated even in the extreme case of complete segregation among the income groups.
At the first glance, this result may look rather surprising, how can cross subsidy between income groups can persist even when low income households shop at totally different locations than high-income households. However, this transfer can be explained by the other terms in the transfer definitions, most notably by the difference in interest payments, float and redistributed profits. (See Section 5.2 for more details.)
The right column in Figure 3 shows the transfers received by high-income households.
The transfer received is at the lowest level ($240 per year) when merchants serve different income groups, and reaches the highest level ($380 per year) in the symmetric distributions given in the yellow areas.
Merchant fee pass-through
Our simple approach to analyzing the effects of different degrees of pass-through of payment costs into retail prices amounts to assume that merchants set their prices based on a constant markup of M k , see Appendix C for a standard derivation leading to this result. To compute the transfers while calibrating the pass-through to any value other than 100 percent, we have to make an additional assumption about what happens to the resulting loss (profit) of the merchant. As in Section 5 in the case of bank profits, we redistribute the resulting (change in the) merchants' profit to households based on their observed shares of stock holdings. Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of our transfer estimates to the pass-through that merchants apply to the costs of handling payment instruments into their price. This figure shows that if merchants do not recoup any payment costs at all (0 percent pass-through) then high-income households will end up subsidizing low-income households. This happens because low-income households contribute a bigger share of the total sales value (58 percent in Table 5 ), while they receive a smaller part (27 percent) of merchants' profit, which is reduced by the lack of pass-through. As merchants pass-through increases, the direction of the subsidy changes.
At around 50 percent pass-through the transfers disappear (x L = x H = 0). As the passthrough increases beyond 50 percent, the transfers from low-to high-income households also increase. This happens partly due to the redistributive effects of the NSR and partly due to the increase in merchants' profits.
Credit card annual fees
Credit card annual fees are another potential source of revenue to fund card rewards that could affect the transfer estimates. If credit card holders pay for their rewards with high annual fees, then our transfer calculations would overstate the transfers. However, this 
Other scenarios
TO BE COMPLETED.
Further discussion
Policy implications
Our analysis suggests that reducing transfers between consumers, especially between lowincome and high-income consumers, may positively affect consumer welfare, but further research is needed to determine the full effects on social welfare. While it is natural to consider public policy initiatives in this endeavor, private sector agents (households, merchants, and banks) could take preemptive actions that would reduce the transfers. However, if private agents are not willing or able to take actions to reduce the transfers, public policy makers may wish to explore policies that would do so. Our research suggests some general principles and issues with potential implications for public policy:
• Cost-based pricing-One condition supporting the transfers is uniform pricing across payment instruments. Allowing and encouraging merchants to charge differential prices according to the costs imposed by payment instruments could help reduce the transfers by reducing payment cross subsidies. Eliminating the NSR may be necessary, but it may not be sufficient to induce differential pricing (for example, see Bolt and van Renselaar (2009) ).
• Full information-Another condition supporting the transfers is the lack of full information about about merchant fees and other aspects of payment costs that have an impact on retail prices and consumer welfare. Giving all participants in the payments market full information about fees, costs, and price markups, could help to reduce transfers by giving consumers the incentive to make optimal payment choices and by spurring more competition among merchants and banks. For example, the 2010 proposed settlement of the U.S. Department of Justice complaint against Visa and MasterCard gives merchants the right to disclose merchant fees and to steer their customers toward low-cost payment methods through enhanced discounting options.
• Rewards-Yet another condition supporting the transfers and encouraging credit card use is the existence of lucrative rewards programs. Reducing rewards, or redistributing the value of the rewards from high-income households to low-income households, would likely reduce credit card use and the regressive transfers.
• Competition-If competition in the credit card market is inadequate, efforts to promote alternative payment instruments could help to reduce the transfers. Expanding access to low-cost existing networks, such as the Automatic Clearing House (ACH), is one possibility.
• Data Collection-Researchers and policy makers will need more data to estimate/calibrate models and compute welfare to analyze potential policies. For example, our research emphasizes the need for better and more comprehensive data on the cost of payment instruments borne by merchants, buyers, banks, and card networks.
More research is needed before pursuing any of these policy implications. Reducing the merchant fee is likely to reduce the transfers, but it is very difficult to determine the optimal merchant (or interchange) fee. Thus, direct regulation of the merchant (or interchange) fee could actually reduce consumer welfare if the wrong level of the fee were selected. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that regulators should consider the merchant fee and reward rate simultaneously, rather than just the interchange fee.
These policy-related principles are closely related to recent policies enacted to regulate payment card interchange fees worldwide. Policy makers in Australia and Spain, as well as the European Commission, have already taken actions to limit the interchange fees associated with credit cards. Actions taken by various countries are discussed in Bradford and Hayashi (2008) . The recent U.S. financial reform bill (officially, the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act" of 2010), signed into law on July 21, 2010, includes the Durbin Amendment, giving the Federal Reserve responsibility for regulating interchange fees associated with debit cards. In each of these cases, regulation of interchange fees was motivated in part by concerns over an alleged lack of competition in payment card markets.
Our analysis provides a different but complementary motivation for policy interventionincome inequality.
Extensions
Our analysis excludes some issues that may be important factors in a more comprehensive assessment of the transfers associated with credit card spending, which we discuss briefly but leave for future research.
Business credit cards:
We have excluded data on credit card spending by business and government, which is about equal in value to consumer credit card spending. If businesses use credit cards at the same establishments as consumers, they would impose further costs on the merchants and raise retail prices even more. If businesses (and their profits) are more likely to be owned by high-income households, then incorporating business use of credit cards into the analysis would increase the transfers from low-income to high-income households.
Congestion (externality) effects: Murphy and Ott (1977) suggests that cash buyers impose more costs on merchants' sales staffs than on card users. If cash transactions take significantly longer to handle than credit card transactions, cash users may impose an externality on card users by slowing them down at the point of payment. This externality would offset, at least partly, the transfer from cash users to card users. However, the available data on the time it takes to handle a transaction by payment method do not provide strong support for this view.
34 It is possible that cash congestion effects may be relevant for highway toll booths, as discussed in Amromin, Jankowski, and Porter (2007) . But electronic toll transponders that serve as a faster alternative to cash are not credit cards, and the proportion of toll payments in total consumption is relatively small.
Conclusion
We proposed an accounting methodology to calculate two types of implicit monetary transfers occurring in a simplified representation of the U.S. payments market: 1) the transfer between cash buyers and credit card buyers; and 2) the transfer between low-income and high-income households. Both of these transfers are estimated to be economically significant and robust to potential changes in the assumptions underlying the accounting methodology.
34 According to a 2000 study by the Food Marketing Institute, titled "It All Adds Up: An Activity Based Cost Study of Retail Payments," a credit card transaction takes longer to handle than a cash transaction: 49 seconds compared to 29 seconds. However, a 2006 study by MasterCard International titled "MasterCard PayPass: The Simpler Way to Pay," finds that the average cash transaction is slower than the average credit card transaction if no signature is required: 34 seconds compared to 27 seconds.
Extending our model and analysis with better data and more realistic features of the credit card market surely would provide more refined quantitative estimates of the these transfers. However, we are confident that the qualitative existence of these two transfers is robust to changes in the model and data.
Appendix A. A model of consumer payment choice All households pay a single good priced p regardless of the means of payment (NSR). Let ρ L and ρ H denote effective reward rates (such as cash-back) on credit card transactions to households belonging to low-and high-income households. Therefore, the effective price paid by buyers belonging to income group i = H, L is p buyer = p(1 − ρ i ) paying with a card p paying cash.
Thus, assuming that buyers spend their entire budget, low-income buyers perform I L /p buyer transactions, whereas high-income buyers perform I H /p buyer transactions. Let 0 < α ≤ 1.
We define the utility function of an income group i buyer who is indexed by (b To compute the transfers between the low-and high-income groups, we would need to sum these transfers up within income groups. Let L denote a sum of all low-income households. Then the total transfer received (paid, if negative) by the low-income group is
which is exactly how we defined transfers in equation (6). The sum of high-income households can be configured in the same way. This proves that our computations of transfers between the low-and the high-income groups is invariant with our characterization of households as only cash, card convenience, or only card revolving only.
have. While the final price does depend on the market power η, it only does so in the "usual" sense that merchants mark up their prices over marginal costs, c. Conditional on the monopolistically competitive price (c/(1+η)), merchants do not markup up their price by more (or less) than what is required to cover the expected cost of a payment. In other words, some market power is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for generating a pass-through that is different from 100 percent. In order to model pass-through one would have to build a more detailed model of the retail industry, which is beyond the scope of our paper. Given the evidence in other countries we think that this an important avenue for future research.
